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he 1956 publication of Simon Rottenberg’s The Baseball 
Players’ Labor Market1 began the serious academic study of 
sports. This insightful article is brimming with ideas and spurred a 
generation of economic analysis.2 It is also a startlingly prescient, if 
un-cited, prelude to Ronald Coase’s subsequent work that gained 
great traction in the legal academy.3 Coase’s article became the most 
cited journal article in the history of legal scholarship4 and earned its 
author the Nobel Prize in Economics.5 Rottenberg’s paper, however, 
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1 Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball Players’ Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242 
(1956), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/faculty/Vrooman/rottenberg.pdf. 
2 Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, Simon Rottenberg and Baseball, Then and 
Now: A 50th Anniversary Retrospective (Vanderbilt Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 
No. 06-W06, 2006), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/workpaper 
/vu06-w06.pdf. 
3 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
4 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012). 
5 The prize in economics awarded in memory of Alfred Nobel is not technically one of 
the Nobel Prizes, but is awarded by the same foundation and announced simultaneously 
with the Nobel Prizes. See Ronald H. Coase–Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobel 
prize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/coase-facts.html (last visited 
T
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has been largely ignored outside of the small world of sports 
economics. Remarkably, it has even been overlooked in the study of 
sports law: ignored by the very scholars that Rottenberg sought to 
address when he applied his explosive thesis to the arcane and prosaic 
baseball labor market. 
Rottenberg’s thesis provides a subtextual challenge to any 
significant question of sports law and should be part of every 
discussion. In summary, Rottenberg argues a form of the invariance 
principle6: that the specific rule of law will not affect the actual 
behavior of the people subject to that rule of law. Rottenberg 
postulated, with reference to the market for baseball players, that the 
players would come to play on the teams that valued them the most,7 
regardless of team revenues8 and regardless of the rules of the labor 
market.9 Obviously, the invariance principle provides an important 
comment on the long historical debate over player free agency and the 
 
Feb. 13, 2014) (listing Coase as the 1991 recipient of the “Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”). 
6 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 254–58; see also WLADIMIR ANDREFF & STEFAN 
SZYMANSKI, HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT I (2006) (naming Rottenberg as 
the “founding father” of the economics of sports for his famous invariance principle). 
7 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 256 (analyzing how a player is sold to another team for a 
higher price because the player is worth more to the team that buys him rather than the 
team that sells him, distributing players “so that they are put to their most ‘productive’ 
use”). 
8 Id. at 254 (rejecting the theory that high-revenue teams would contract all the best 
players, which would lead to very unequal teams, because such a process would “be 
checked by the law of diminishing returns, operating concurrently with each team’s 
strategic avoidance of diseconomies of scale”). 
9 Id. at 258 (concluding that the free labor market, or any alternative, would produce 
similar results where all teams must be “nearly equal” for each individual team to 
prosper); see also Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 604 (“With fifty years of 
hindsight and subsequent research, Rottenberg’s logic and observations stand up 
remarkably well . . . competition in baseball appears to be as vigorous today as debates 
about it.”). 
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concomitant demise of baseball’s “reserve system”10 and should have 
been a significant touchstone in that discussion.11 
It should also supply an important comment on the impending 
changes in collegiate sports.12 Like the historic labor market in 
 
10 See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 
F.2d 615, 632 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming the “Seitz Decision,” an arbitration decision in 
favor of the MLB Players Association, which declared two pitchers free agents and 
essentially ended the reserve system); see also Darren Rovell, The Early Days of Free 
Agency, ESPN.COM (Dec. 2, 2000, 5:03 PM), http://static.espn.go.com/mlb/s/2000/1121 
/893718.html (recounting the “Seitz Decision” and the beginning of free agency in 
baseball); see generally LEE LOWENFISH & TONY LUPIEN, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: 
THE STORY BEHIND BASEBALL’S RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE MEN WHO FOUGHT TO 
CHANGE IT (1980) (portraying baseball’s tumultuous history between labor and 
management). 
11 Under baseball’s “reserve system,” which first appeared in player contracts in 1887, 
teams could exercise exclusive contract rights over a player for the player’s entire career. 
The clause checked player salaries and prevented big market teams from monopolizing the 
game’s best players. The system would withstand several antitrust challenges, the most 
famous by Philadelphia Phillies outfielder Curt Flood. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972) (holding that baseball’s reserve system was exempt from federal antitrust laws). 
Yet the players would finally break the system in 1975, when an arbitration panel ruled 
that the reserve clause bound a player to a team for only one year after his contract 
expired. The decision would lead to the players and owners reaching the 1976 Basic 
Agreement, which resulted in the following compromise: teams could reserve players with 
fewer than six years of service; after six years they would become free agents. See Daniel 
C. Glazer, Can’t Anybody Here Run This Game? The Past, Present and Future of Major 
League Baseball, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339 (1999) (providing a historical overview 
of the legal challenges brought against the reserve system, including the Flood litigation, 
the 1975 arbitration decision striking down the clause, and the 1976 Basic Agreement); 
HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS, 104–15 (Oxford Univ. Press 1960) 
(describing the owners’ desire during the early years of baseball to keep labor costs down, 
and how their realization that competition among themselves for players was causing 
salaries to rise led to them implementing the reserve clause); History of the Major League 
Baseball Players Association, MLBPLAYERS.COM, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info 
/history.jsp (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (summarizing former Major League Baseball 
Players Association executive director Marvin Miller’s role in bringing an end to the 
reserve clause); Jennifer K. Ashcraft & Craig Depken II, The Introduction of the Reserve 
Clause in Major League Baseball: Evidence of its Impact on Select Player Salaries During 
the 1880s, at 1, 19 (Int’l Ass’n of Sports Economists & N. Am. Ass’n of Sports 
Economists, Working Paper No. 0710, 2007), available at http://belkcollegeofbusiness 
.uncc.edu/cdepken/P/rc18.pdf (examining the reserve clause’s impact on player salaries 
and finding that after it was implemented in 1887, it decreased player salaries by ten 
percent and decreased the premiums players received when changing teams by fifty 
percent). 
12 See Dennis Dodd, Paying Athletes Figures to be Key Issue at Annual NCAA 
Convention, CBSSPORTS.COM (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://www.cbssports.com 
/collegefootball/writer/dennis-dodd/24409747/compensating-athletes-figures-to-be-key     
-issue-at-annual-ncaa-convention (terming the advent of compensation as the biggest event 
in the NCAA’s 108-year history. Between the threat of sixty-five schools from the five 
biggest conferences leaving the NCAA for realignment, and congressional or judicial 
regulation, it has become evident that “revenue from a national multi-billion dollar 
STANDEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2014  12:37 PM 
1096 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 1093 
baseball, the contemporary market for labor in college athletics is 
regulated by a series of restrictions on compensation and 
movement.13 These restrictions appear in danger of imminent 
demise,14 auguring for a new era of comparatively free player 
 
amateur athletic enterprise [will be shared] with the partners who helped make that money. 
The players.”); see also Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
1, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying        
-college-athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (setting forth a modest plan to pay college 
student-athletes, while also comparing the debate to baseball free agency and the 
Olympic’s abandonment of amateurism, both of which improved the respective platforms. 
The results in college sports would be the same: “College sports will become more honest 
once players are paid, and more honorable . . . Yes, it’s true: paying players will change 
college sports. They will be better, too.”); see generally Stephen M. Schott, Give Them 
What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAW J. 25 (1996) (discussing the history of the NCAA and 
amateurism, compensation and antitrust laws, compensation alternatives, and the effects 
on athletic programs); but see Jeffrey Dorfman, Pay College Athletes? They’re Already 
Paid Up To $125,000 Per Year, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2013/08/29/pay-college-athletes-theyre-already-paid-up-to         
-125000year/ (“Colleges are already compensating their student athletes with tuition, 
room, board, coaching, nutritional support, and physical trainers that can exceed $100,000 
per year in value. Student athletes are already paid and the current system is pretty close to 
as fair as we are going to get. Paying a few of them more will not improve college 
sports.”), and Associated Press, NCAA President: Not a Good Idea, ESPN.COM (Sept. 17, 
2013, 12:50 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/9682086/ncaa-budge-paying 
-college-athletes (highlighting the NCAA President’s remarks that while the structure of 
the NCAA may change, amateur college student-athletes will not turn into professionals. 
Also, the large number of small schools that oppose paying players, along with the larger 
schools’ unwillingness to leave “March Madness” and the NCAA championships, prevents 
this radical change.). 
13 See Remaining Eligible: Amateurism, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/remaining    
-eligible-amateurism (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (listing factors that would prevent an 
athlete from being considered an amateur, and thus, the athlete would be ineligible to play 
in the NCAA: “Contracts with professional teams . . . [s]alary for participating in athletics 
. . . [p]rize money above actual and necessary expenses . . . [p]lay with professionals . . . 
[t]ryouts, practice, or competition with a professional team . . . [b]enefits from an agent or 
prospective agent . . . [a]greement to be represented by an agent . . . [and] [d]elayed initial 
full-time collegiate enrollment to participate in organized sports competition . . .”); see 
also NCAA, TRANSFER 101: BASIC INFORMATION YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
TRANSFERRING TO AN NCAA COLLEGE 12 (2013-14), available at http://www.ncaa 
publications.com/p-4327-ncaa-transfer-guide-2013-14.aspx (laying out the complex 
analysis surrounding a player’s eligibility when transferring schools where the basic rule is 
“[an athlete] must spend one academic year in residence at [a] new school before [the 
athlete is] eligible to compete”). 
14 See supra note 11; see also Greg Bishop, Want To Play at a Different College? O.K., 
But Not There or There, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/06/08/sports/ncaafootball/college-coaches-use-transfer-rules-to-limit-athletes   
-options.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (telling the story of Wes Lunt, a former Oklahoma 
State quarterback, who “had nearly 40 transfer options blocked by his former coach” as a 
show of “gamesmanship and punishment”). 
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movement incentivized by some form of compensation. Aside from 
the normative question as to whether or not college student-athletes 
should be paid, the question that Rottenberg raises is whether the 
dawn of salaried student-athletes will result in a noticeable change in 
the composition of teams or play on the field. 
This Article argues that compensating players will not lead to a 
fundamental change in college sports. The teams and programs that 
win the most games currently will continue to win, or at least will not 
lose because of the advent of player compensation. Student-athletes 
who in the past would have attended non-elite schools will not choose 
differently on account of the availability of potentially greater 
compensation elsewhere. The top programs will continue to attract the 
finest coaching talent, and will continue to fund college athletics as 
before.15 In short, the future of college sports will look very similar to 
its present. The demise of the amateur ideal, however undesirable on 
other grounds, will not likely change the nature of collegiate athletic 
competition. 
I 
THE INVARIANCE PRINCIPLE AND THE BASEBALL LABOR MARKET 
Rottenberg found the structure of professional baseball “interesting 
because of some unusual characteristics”16 of its labor market and the 
organization of the industry. Unlike tacit anti-pirating agreements that 
one might find in other labor markets,17 baseball had enacted an 
explicit set of rules that created a monopsony,18 in which players 
 
15 See, e.g., Division I Schools Spend More on Athletes Than Education, USA TODAY 
(July 14, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/01/15 
/division-i-colleges-spend-more-on-athletes-than-education/1837721/ (revealing that 
NCAA Division I universities “spend as much as six times more per athlete than they 
spend to educate students,” which for the ninety-seven public schools which compete in 
the top-tier Football Bowl Subdivision is $92,000 per athlete compared to $14,000 per 
full-time student), and Sean Gregory, College Sports Spending Is Insane, TIME (Dec. 4, 
2013), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2013/12/04/college-sports-spending-is-insane/ 
(listing Ohio State as the top football spending school, where in 2011, the university spent 
$380,757 per scholarship football player. The Southeastern Conference is the top spending 
conference, spending $176,429 per athlete and $259,251 per scholarship football player); 
see generally Athletic & Academic Spending Database for NCAA Division I, KNIGHT 
COMM’N, http://spendingdatabase.knightcommission.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) 
(providing a searchable database tracking athletic and academic spending). 
16 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 242. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 252; but see Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 604 (discussing the 
dramatic shift in the baseball player’s labor market since 1956). 
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could sell their labor only to a single potential buyer, specifically the 
team that first signed the player or otherwise held his rights. In 
addition, in what he termed an aspect “unique” to professional 
competitive sports,19 each competitor in the industry must be of 
“approximately equal size” if they are to be successful.20 Unlike other 
industries, the ultimate goal of any particular franchise was not to 
drive its competitor firms out of the market. Competitive balance, 
wherein equally matched teams could engage in a contest with an 
uncertain outcome, was required for the success of the league.21 
Teams essentially were cooperating producers of a joint good, namely 
the game contest and the seasonal competition.22 
This description of competitive baseball, and impliedly competitive 
sports at all levels, animated a large economic literature on the 
“uncertainty-of-outcome” hypothesis23 that debates the proper 
measure of competitive balance and its correlation with a successful 
 
19 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 242. 
20 See id. at 242, 254–55. 
21 Id. at 254–55. 
22 Id. (“Two teams opposed to each other in play are like two firms producing a single 
product. The product is the game, weighted by the revenues derived from its play.”). 
23 Rottenberg summarizes his “uncertainty-of-outcome” theory in footnote twenty-one 
of his article: “[T]he ‘tighter’ the competition, the larger the attendance.” Rottenberg, 
supra note 1, at 246 n.21. For articles that have applied or discussed Rottenberg’s 
“uncertainty-of-outcome” hypothesis, see the following: Dennis Coates & Brad R. 
Humphreys, Game Attendance and Outcome Uncertainty in the National Hockey League 
14 (Int’l Ass’n of Sports Economists & N. Am. Ass’n of Sports Economists, Working 
Paper No. 1114, 2012) [hereinafter Outcome Uncertainty] (examining NHL attendance 
from the 2005–2006 to 2009–2010 season and finding that “[r]ather than simply preferring 
to see games where the outcome is highly uncertain . . . fans prefer to attend games the 
home team is expected to win, . . . other things equal”); Daniel A. Rascher & John Paul G. 
Solmes, Do Fans Want Close Contests? A Test of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis 
in the National Basketball Association, 2 INT’L J. SPORTS FIN. 130, 137 (2007) 
(concluding that fan attendance at home games is optimized when the outcome is 
uncertain, but the home team is still favored to win); Rodney Fort, The Golden 
Anniversary of “The Baseball Players’ Labor Market,” 6 J. SPORTS ECON. 347, 348 
(2005) (providing a review of Rottenberg’s seminal article fifty years after its publication, 
and concluding that the article’s importance makes Rottenberg “the father of sports 
economics”); David Frost & Robert Simmons, Outcome Uncertainty and Attendance 
Demand in Sport: The Case of English Soccer, 51 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y (THE 
STATISTICIAN) 229, 239 (2002) (collecting data on English professional soccer league 
matches played between October 1997 and May 1998, and concluding that uncertainty-of-
outcome increases attendance for an individual match, but that improving competitive 
balance throughout the league would not necessarily increase attendance); Glenn Knowles 
et al., The Demand for Major League Baseball: A Test of the Uncertainty of Outcome 
Hypothesis, 36 AM. ECONOMIST 72, 77 (1992) (testing the uncertainty-of-outcome 
hypothesis against the 1988 baseball season and finding that competitive balance increases 
attendance, with attendance being maximized when the home team is slightly favored). 
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sports league.24 It also sparked a host of solutions to the problem of 
competitive imbalance.25 Leagues seeking to create or ensure 
competitive balance enacted various measures to induce parity, 
including revenue sharing,26 salary caps,27 luxury taxes,28 imbalanced 
 
24 See James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust 
Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 521 (2011) (linking 
“competitive balance” and “uncertainty of outcome.” When there is a greater balance of 
competition within a league, the outcome of the games within the league become less 
predictable. While there are good and bad teams in every league, “the overall success of a 
league requires that teams be relatively evenly matched in terms of playing ability.” The 
less predictable the outcomes, the greater the interest in the games. For example, “[i]f the 
Super Bowl champion was obvious before the season began, that would significantly 
undercut the interest in NFL regular season and playoff games.”); Glenn Knowles et al., 
supra note 23, at 77–78 (concluding from the research conducted that the uncertainty of a 
game’s outcome was a “significant determinant of attendance . . . indicat[ing] that 
competitive balance is important in MLB.” League attendance is maximized when home 
teams are considered slight favorites, but all of the teams in the league are relatively equal 
in skill and ability.); Michael Lewis, Individual Team Incentives and Managing 
Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues: An Empirical Analysis of Major League Baseball, 
45 J. MARKETING. RES. 535, 536 (2008) (citing Walter Neale, The Peculiar Economics of 
Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1964), and Rodney Fort & James Quirk, Cross-
Subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues, 33 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1265 (1995) (reviewing the literary history and debate regarding 
Rottenberg’s “uncertainty of outcome hypothesis”); Glenn Knowles et al., Baseball 
Attendance and Outcome Uncertainty: Reply, 39 AM. ECONOMIST 88 (1995) (conceding 
that conclusions regarding uncertainty-of-outcome are based on probabilities, for “[i]t is 
impossible to directly test for the hypothesis that fans have a strong preference for 
certainty, since no such observations exist . . . [concluding that] the uncertainty of outcome 
is a significant determinant of attendance at major league baseball games”). See generally 
Frost & Simmons, supra note 23 (analyzing uncertainty-of-outcome in the National 
Hockey League), and CRAIG A. DEPKEN, II & DENNIS P. WILSON, THE UNCERTAINTY OF 
OUTCOME HYPOTHESIS IN DIVISION IA COLLEGE FOOTBALL (2010) (unpublished), 
available at http://belkcollegeofbusiness.uncc.edu/cdepken/P/UOH12.pdf (analyzing 
uncertainty-of-outcome in Division I NCAA College Football). 
25 Major League Baseball until recently had enacted the fewest “parity-producing” 
rules. It did not require teams to abide by a salary cap. It did not specify a maximum 
salary. Because its franchises depended so much on local attendance revenue and local 
television contracts for their revenue, it did not have a strong system for revenue sharing 
among teams, apart from the national broadcast revenues. Despite comparatively few 
parity rules, baseball has always featured substantial competitive balance. Even the worst 
teams in the league consistently win four out of ten games; the best win six out of ten. 
Other professional sports, albeit with a shorter schedule, do exhibit much greater 
competitive disparity, despite having a plethora of parity-inducing rules. The game of 
baseball inherently produces competitive balance, perhaps because luck on batted balls 
plays such a large role in game outcomes. 
26 See Justin R. Hunt, To Share or Not To Share: Revenue Sharing Structures in 
Professional Sports, 13 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 139, 139 (2012) (“Every league 
[NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL] acknowledges that the purpose of a revenue sharing 
agreement is to allow a closer range of payroll spending that might otherwise not be 
accomplished, preventing large market teams from controlling the allocation of high-
priced free agents.”). 
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schedules,29 drafting newcomers in reverse order of finish,30 and 
various waiver and release systems31 designed to allow movement of 
marginal players to help supply weaker teams. 
 
27 See, e.g., 2013 NFL Salary Cap Increases to $123 Million, USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 
2013, 10:15 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2013/02/28/2013-nfl-salary    
-cap-increases-to-123-million/1955515/ (detailing changes to the NFL collective 
bargaining agreement, where the main labor dispute was “how to divide the more than $9 
billion in annual league revenues, a figure that will keep rising, particularly once the 
NFL’s new television contracts kick in for the 2014 season”); see also Thomas C. Pincher, 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the Effect on Salary Cap and 
Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 37–43 (1997) (explaining salary 
cap provisions and providing relevant case law). 
28 E.g., Eric Pincus, Lakers Limited by Luxury Taxes, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/08/sports/la-sp-lakers-finances-20130809 (“Each year 
the NBA sets a spending limit that triggers the luxury tax. In eight of the last ten seasons, 
the Lakers have willingly crossed that line. The penalty has been a dollar-for-dollar tax, 
costing the Lakers a cumulative $113.7 million since the 2002–03 season.”), and 
Associated Press, Yankees Hit With $28M Luxury Tax, ESPN.COM (Dec. 18, 2013, 5:00 
AM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/10154043/new-york-yankees-hit-28m-luxury-tax. 
29 See, e.g., Peter Schmuck, Baseball’s Unbalanced Schedules Don’t Lead to Fair Play, 
BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 7, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-03-07/sports/bal    
-sp.schmuck07mar07_1_major-league-baseball-schedule-andy-macphail (arguing against 
unbalanced schedules, where the Baltimore Orioles, for example, have to play the New 
York Yankees and Boston Red Sox a disproportionate amount of games per year), and 
Danny Knobler, MLB May Go to a More Unbalanced (And More Unfair?) Schedule, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (June 6, 2012, 1:34 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/writer/danny    
-knobler/19280228/mlb-may-go-to-a-more-unbalanced-and-more-unfair-schedule 
(discussing the difficulties with MLB scheduling); see generally Liam J.A. Lenten, The 
Extent to Which Unbalanced Schedules Cause Distortions in Sports League Tables, 28 
ECON. MODELLING 451 (2011). 
30 See Aaron Gordon, The Myth of Competitive Balance, SPORTS ON EARTH (Aug. 8, 
2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/56193798/ (“Similarly, reverse-order drafts 
are often—but not unanimously—believed to increase competitive balance, although to 
what degree is often contested. This is because—unlike revenue sharing which simply 
shuffles money around—drafts reallocate talent.”); e.g., Complete Order of First Round of 
2011 NFL Draft Determined, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Aug. 15, 2012, 8:36 PM), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81d6b708/article/complete-order-of-first-round  
-of-2011-nfl-draft-determined (laying out the procedures for determining the order of the 
NFL draft). 
31 See Brian McFarland, How Does the NFL’s Waiver System Work?, RUSSELL ST. 
REP. (Aug. 24, 2013), http://russellstreetreport.com/how-does-the-nfls-waiver-system        
-work-2/ (explaining the NFL’s waiver system, where a player can be “waived” by a team, 
which gives any other team twenty-four hours to “claim” the player. If multiple teams 
claim the player, the worst team-according to record-receives the player. After this twenty-
four hour period expires, the unclaimed player becomes a free agent); see, e.g., Mike 
Florio, Waivers System Now Applies to All Players, NBC SPORTS (Oct. 30, 2013, 8:59 
AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/30/waivers-system-now-applies-to-all  
-players/ (providing examples of how players can end up with a team for whom they do 
not wish to play after being claimed on waivers). 
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Although many of the “parity” rules of Major League Baseball and 
other professional sports leagues remained unrealized at the time 
Rottenberg wrote, he did presciently discuss various methods by 
which professional baseball had tried or might attempt to create 
competitive balance. 
Foremost on the list was baseball’s infamous “reserve system.”32 
Baseball had for decades sought to maintain competitive balance by 
making its player contracts automatically renewable at the discretion 
of the team.33 It also precluded players who had played to the 
completion of their un-renewed contract from playing with other 
teams,34 enforcing this obvious limit on the freedom of labor by 
disqualifying any team that signed such a player from eligibility to 
participate in the league.35 Baseball also gained a monopoly on the 
players’ services and on each team’s schedule, precluding players or 
 
32 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
33 Id.; see generally Ed Edmonds, Arthur Soden’s Legacy: The Origins and Early 
History of Baseball’s Reserve System, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 38 (2012) (detailing the long 
history of baseball’s reserve system). 
34 For the stories of two athletes who resorted to litigation in an effort to escape their 
contract commitments, see Anthony Cotton, The Courting of Danny Ainge, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 1981), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 
1124867/1/index.html. The article provides an overview of Danny Ainge’s struggle to 
terminate his contract with the Toronto Blue Jays so that he could play in the NBA for the 
Boston Celtics. After losing a jury trial on the issue, Ainge would eventually reach the 
NBA, become an NBA all-star, and win two NBA championships. Ainge was named the 
Boston Celtics president of basketball operations in 2003, and he still holds this position as 
of 2014. See Roger I. Abrams, Sports Arbitration and Enforcing Promises: Brian Shaw 
and Labor Arbitration, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 223 (2009). The article tells the story of 
Brian Shaw’s journey from the NBA to the Italian Basketball League and back to the 
NBA. Shaw played one year for the Celtics, left to go play in Italy, and then signed 
another contract to come back to play for the Celtics. Shortly after signing his new 
contract with the Celtics, he wanted to escape the contract to capitalize on free agency the 
following year. Shaw lost in arbitration and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit ultimately affirmed that decision. Boston Celtics Ltd. Partnership v. Shaw, 
908 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1990). Shaw went on to win three NBA championships and as of 
the 2013–2014 season was the head coach of the NBA’s Denver Nuggets. 
35 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 245–46; see also Richard L. Irwin, A Historical Review 
of Litigation in Baseball, 1 MARQ. SPORTS. L.J. 283, 287 (1991) (citing Philadelphia Ball 
Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902)) (enforcing the reserve clause because Lajoie’s skills 
were of a “unique” or “peculiar” nature, which would cause the Philadelphia Phillies 
irreparable harm); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 
79 VA. L. REV. 383, 403 (1993) (citing Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) and Central New York Basketball Club v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio 
Ct. C.P. 1961)) (“Since the Lajoie decision, a number of other courts have enforced 
restrictive covenants against players who sought to switch teams (or leagues) between 
seasons or even, in some cases, after sitting out a season.”). 
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teams from competing in extra-league contests.36 Finally, each 
baseball franchise, including many in the minor leagues, was entitled 
to specify a “reserve list” of players, whose number could extend 
beyond the current major league roster and with whom rival teams 
could not contract.37 The need for the reserve system, Rottenberg 
stated, was to assure an equal distribution of playing talent among 
opposing teams in order to create the requisite “uncertainty of 
outcome” to entice consumers to pay admission to the game.38 
Without the reserve clause, or impliedly some other mechanism to 
ensure fair dispersal of the better players among several teams, then, 
reciting an argument very familiar to the contemporary baseball fan, 
“the rich clubs would outbid the poor for talent, taking all the 
competent players for themselves and leaving only the incompetent 
for the other teams.”39 
Yet even under the reserve system, Rottenberg argued, despite its 
draconian limitations on the movement of labor, the richer teams 
prevailed.40 They could offer higher prices to other teams for the 
purchase of player contracts, for example in the way the New York 
Yankees purchased the contract of baseball’s then reigning home-run 
leader Babe Ruth from the Boston franchise.41 In the free agent 
period at the start of the player’s career, before the institution of the 
 
36 See Avraham J. Sommer, The National Pastime of the American Judiciary: 
Reexamining the Strength of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Following the 
Passage of the Curt Flood Act and the Supreme Court’s Ruling in American Needle, Inc. 
v. NFL, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 325, 327 (2012) (“The Reserve System was composed of two 
clauses in player contracts that restricted player mobility. First, the Reserve Clause 
prohibited a ballplayer from playing for another team during the term of his contract and in 
the succeeding year. Second, the Option Clause enabled management to unilaterally renew 
a player’s contract for one year following the inability of the parties to reach an agreement. 
The concurrent existence of these two clauses resulted in the perpetual renewal of an 
individual player’s contract at the whim of team ownership. The Reserve System 
effectively controlled player costs by eliminating the market for player services.”). 
37 See ALBERT THEODORE POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 17–19 (2003) 
(discussing how the reserve system “controlled owners’ costs by eliminating competition 
for players’ services.” A reserve list could extend to cover eleven of the fourteen players 
on each team.). 
38 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 246. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 247 (pointing to the New York Yankees “fortune” and overwhelming success 
when compared to other teams. For example, “[i]n the period 1920–51 the New York 
Yankees led the American League in eighteen years, and the Chicago White Sox in 
none.”). 
41 Id. at 245, 253; see also ALLAN WOOD, BABE RUTH AND THE 1918 RED SOX 220 
(2000) (explaining the three options that a player had: (1) have a club bid for his services, 
(2) make the best out of the situation with the reserving club, or (3) retire). 
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entry draft, the richer teams could offer higher salaries and higher 
prospects for lifetime earnings, both from playoff shares and from 
contract renewals.42 By investing more heavily in their minor league 
teams and their coaching salaries, the richer teams could provide 
themselves with a larger pool of competent substitutes to maintain 
their competitive edge.43 In short, “the teams that were prepared to 
outbid others for players [had] not been frustrated by the [reserve] 
rule.”44 
Rottenberg’s next thought jumps off the page. “It will also be 
shown that a market in which freedom is limited by the reserve rule 
cannot be expected to equalize the distribution of players among 
teams more than a market in which there is perfect freedom.”45 This 
apparently offhand remark at the end of the discussion about the 
reserve system creates the electricity for the last few pages of the 
article. It turns out that none of the extant means of ensuring 
competitive balance will equalize the distribution of players any 
better than would an unrestricted labor market. 
For example, baseball’s incipient waiver system allowed teams to 
draft unprotected players from competitor teams upon the payment of 
a stipulated fee, in effect a forced sale at a predetermined price.46 
Order of drafting was conducted in reverse order of the final 
standings from the previous season,47 thus attempting to supply better 
players to weaker teams. Instead of benefitting losing teams, however, 
the cheap sale price would induce the better teams to sell or trade 
eligible players worth more than the stipulated price prior to the 
waiver period, thus extracting full value.48 This trade, of course, 
would not necessarily be completed with a losing team, but instead 
 
42 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 244. 
43 See id. at 243. 
44 Id. at 247. 
45 Id. at 247–48. 
46 Id. at 248. 
47 Id. at 248–49. This order of drafting remains the same in the modern “First-Year 
Player Draft.” First-Year Player Draft FAQ, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday 
/faq.jsp (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (“Major League clubs select in reverse order of their 
records at the close of the preceding season, without regard to League. . . . Additional 
selections are also awarded to Clubs that lost certain types of Major League free agent 
players after the previous season.”). 
48 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 249 (explaining how if a minor league team had three 
players each worth $40,000, the team would simply sell all of the players at full value 
before the draft to avoid losing value for the one player who would have been drafted). 
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the player would go to the highest bidder.49 In the end, the players 
subject to the waiver and draft process would be those whose worth 
was properly reflected in the draft price.50 Losing teams would find 
no bargains in the waiver draft that would increase the collective 
value of their rosters. 
A free market in baseball labor would not change its distribution. 
In Rottenberg’s view,51 what would prohibit wealthier teams from 
acquiring all or most of the useful baseball talent is the law of 
diminishing returns,52 along with diseconomies of scale.53 The latter 
consideration is apparent to anyone familiar with the game. At some 
point, a team can have too many good players. Coaches can mentor 
only so many players; only one player can take the field at shortstop; 
only a few pitchers can be awarded with the significant role of the 
starter. Some players have to come off the bench or remain in the 
minor league. High-quality players relegated to inferior roles will 
want to move to teams where their contributions can be more 
valuable. The law of diminishing returns amplifies this tendency. 
Employing high-salaried stars in inferior roles, or even theoretically 
as backups relegated to the minor leagues, effectively reduces team 
revenue. Each win costs more; the marginal revenue from wins 
diminishes,54 until it is exceeded by the marginal cost of adding 
another player. In short, it will not pay to increase the “factor”—the 
quality of players on one team—without limit. At some point, 
Rottenberg writes, a “first star player” is worth more to the inferior 
 
49 Id. (“[The team] sells, of course, to the highest bidder, without regard to the previous 
season’s rank position of the bidding teams.”). 
50 Id. (concluding that the valuable players would be sold before the draft, and the 
players actually drafted were only worth the draft price. Thus, the only bargain in the draft 
would be the result of a market miscalculation.). 
51 Id. at 254. 
52 Id.; see also Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague 
Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
51, 84 n.184 (2006) (“Sport, like many other industries, suffers from diminishing marginal 
returns. Thus, the more talent a team accumulates, the less valuable each new talented 
player is. That player, however, retains his high value to less talented teams. In a 
competitive market, this forces teams to internalize the cost of stockpiling talent.”). 
53 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 254. 
54 See, e.g., MLB Cost Per Win (By Season): 2013 MLB Season, SPORTING CHARTS, 
http://www.sportingcharts.com/mlb/stats/mlb-cost-per-win-by-season/2013/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014) (comparing the New York Yankees payroll, which cost $2,692,182 per win, 
yet the team missed the playoffs; and the Houston Astros payroll, which cost only 
$432,600 per win for the league’s worst record. The World Series Champions, the Boston 
Red Sox, spent $1,553,149 per win; while the Oakland Athletics won 96 games at 
$631,922 per win.). 
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team than he would be as the “third star [player]” on the rich team.55 
“At this point, [the inferior team] is in a position to bid players away” 
from the superior team.56 The superior team’s “behavior is not a 
function of its bank balance.”57 
II 
THE LABOR MARKET IN COLLEGE SPORTS 
Although it is a mistake to characterize the university as a 
monopsonist,58 college sports do feature competitors that are roughly 
“equal in size.” Universities differ in student population59 and 
financial endowment,60 but for athletic purposes they are grouped by 
the NCAA into divisions.61 Divisions are determined according to the 
school’s financial commitment to athletics. Within divisions, teams 
are equalized by limiting the number of financial grants62 and by 
 
55 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 255. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (explaining that selling a “third star player” can be a beneficial strategy regardless 
of financial position). 
58 See Richard B. McKenzie & E. Thomas Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College 
Athletes? An Economics and Legal Reinterpretation, 32 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 373 
(1987). 
59 Delece Smith-Barrow, 10 Universities With the Largest Undergraduate Populations, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/education/best            
-colleges/the-short-list-college/articles/2013/12/03/10-universities-with-the-largest-under 
graduate-populations (listing different university populations, including the largest 
population at DeVry University and the smallest population at College of St. Joseph in 
Vermont). 
60 NACUBO, 2013-NACUBO COMMONFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENT RESULTS, 
TABLE: ALL U.S. AND CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS, 2012 to 2013 (2014), available at 
http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/Endowment%20Files/2013NCSEEndowmentMarket 
ValuesRevisedJan232014.pdf. The National Association of College and University 
Business Officers performs a study every year on American and Canadian university 
endowments. In 2013, there were 849 universities on the list. Harvard University had the 
largest financial endowment, totaling $32 billion. By contrast, Southern Virginia 
University accounted for the lowest financial endowment of $714,000. 
61 NCAA, 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 20.01.2 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf 
(“Each active and provisional member institution and member conference is designated as 
a member of Division I, Division II or Division III for certain legislative and competitive 
purposes.”). 
62 Id. § 15.5.4 (permitting Division I baseball a total of 11.7 full scholarships per year); 
see also id. § 15.5.3.1.1 (permitting Men’s Tennis 4.5 full scholarships each year); id. § 
15.5.5.2 (permitting Women’s Basketball 15 full scholarships per year); id. 15.5.5.1 
(permitting Men’s Basketball 13 full scholarships per year). 
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restricting team size.63 Teams are also constrained in the methods of 
recruiting players,64 limitations on transfers of student-athletes,65 
limits on the size of coaching staffs,66 and roster size.67 
In effect, college student-athletes are compensated. Most high-level 
student-athletes receive a full college scholarship. The typical athletic 
scholarship includes tuition, which at higher-end schools can surpass 
$40,000 per year.68 An athletic scholarship also includes free lodging, 
often in athlete-only dorms, or otherwise in the university’s best 
dorms or apartments.69 The athletes get free meals, typically at the 
highest level of today’s college meal plans. Free books70 and waived 
student fees71 are included as well. The total estimated cost to attend 
an elite college now adds up to over $50,000 per year.72 Individual 
student-athletes may not place that high of a value on the full 
scholarship; nonetheless, the market value of the compensation is in 
 
63 Id. § 15.5.3.1.1 (granting Men’s Soccer a maximum of 9.9 scholarships every year); 
see id.(permitting Men’s Golf a maximum of 4.5 scholarships to grant players every year). 
64 Id. § 13.1.3 (discussing the rule on telephone calls coaches can make to players). 
65 Id. § 14.5.5.1 (requiring student-athletes attending a four-year college who transfer to 
another college to complete one full academic year before they are eligible to participate in 
sports at the new institution). 
66 Id. § 11.7.2 (limiting Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) programs to one head coach, 
nine assistant coaches, and four graduate assistant coaches); see also id. § 11.7.4 (limiting 
Men’s and Women’s Soccer to three coaches each, Men’s and Women’s Basketball to four 
coaches each, and Men’s and Women’s Volleyball to three coaches each). 
67 Id. § 17.2.8.3 (rule stating that a Division I baseball team is limited to a maximum of 
thirty-five players). 
68 National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews 
.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/data (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2014) (showing that tuition and fees for the top ten universities in the United 
States are at least $40,000). 
69 Rustin Dodd, Upscale Athlete Housing is the Next Weapon in College Sports’ Arms 
Race, KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.kansascity.com/2014/01/18 
/4761752/upscale-athlete-housing-is-the.html (discussing multimillion-dollar dorms built 
for athletes at prominent Division I universities and how these will provide an extra 
incentive to recruits). 
70 How Do Athletics Scholarships Work?, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about 
/resources/media-center/how-do-athletics-scholarships-work (last visited Mar. 20, 2014) 
(“Full scholarships cover tuition and fees, room, board and required course-related 
books.”). 
71 Id. 
72 Ranking America’s Top Colleges 2013, FORBES (July 24, 2013, 9:46 AM), available 
at http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward/2013/07/24/ranking-americas-top-colleges 
-2013/ (listing the price to attend a top-thirty university in the United States, which costs 
between $51,337 (University of Virginia) to $62,245 (University of Chicago)). 
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the range of $200,00073 over a college career, all tax-free. That is real 
value for an eighteen-year-old whose next best job would in most 
cases start near the minimum wage.74 
Student-athletes also receive a college degree, or at least a good 
chance at one,75 which translates into a lifetime of superior 
earnings.76 Particularly for those athletes whose academic potential is 
modest, a degree from a quality university represents a significant 
enhancement to expected earnings.77 These students also receive top-
level coaching and training facilities, a consequential benefit to 
serious athletes. Finally, for those in one of the two major college 
sports, football and basketball, college athletics affords them a chance 
at exposure and stardom.78 Exposure on the playing field can give 
athletes some measure of local or national fame, resulting in immense 
 
73 How Do Athletic Scholarships Work, supra note 70 (discussing how full scholarships 
at out-of-state, public schools average $25,000 a year, while full scholarships at private 
universities average $35,000 a year). 
74 Of course, student-athletes who receive grants-in-aid might, if none were offered, 
attend college and do so with the benefit of financial assistance. The value of the athletic 
scholarship in any individual case should be reduced by the amount a particular student 
would have received from a scholarship based on some criterion other than athletic 
prowess. 
75 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Division I Student-Athletes Show Progress in Graduation 
Success Rate, NCAA.COM (Oct. 24, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa 
/article/2013-10-24/division-i-student-athletes-show-progress-graduation-success-rate 
(discussing how the overall graduation rate for student-athletes is sixty-five percent.); see 
id. (discussing athletes at the Division I level who entered college in 2006 and earned a 
degree); id. (discussing how seventy-one percent of FBS student-athletes graduated). 
76 ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. & THE 
WORKFORCE, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS 6 
(2011), available at http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/collegepayoff    
-summary.pdf (indicating those who obtain a Bachelor’s degree will earn eighty-three 
percent more over their lifetime than someone with a high school diploma). See id. at 6 
(discussing how on average, a worker with a Bachelor’s degree will earn $2.4 million over 
a lifetime, whereas a worker with a high school diploma will earn $1.5 million over a 
lifetime). 
77 2013-2014 PAYSCALE COLLEGE SALARY REPORT, PAYSCALE, http://www.payscale 
.com/college-salary-report-2014/full-list-of-schools (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) 
(displaying a study comparing earnings for graduates in most universities in the United 
States. For instance, Stanford University graduates earn an average starting salary of 
$61,300. Northern Kentucky University graduates earn an average starting salary of 
$42,300.). 
78 Kristi Dosh, A Comparison: Conference Television Deals, ESPN.COM (Mar. 19, 
2013, 5:15 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/3163/a-comparison     
-conference-television-deals (discussing comparisons between conferences and the value 
of television contracts); see also Chris Smith, A BCS Playoff TV Contract Will be Worth 
More Than $1 Billion, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2012, 1:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/chrissmith/2012/04/27/a-bcs-playoff-tv-contract-will-be-worth-more-than-1-billion/ 
(discussing how the value of televised college football has rapidly increased). 
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college fun and improved post-college job prospects. More 
significantly, stardom gives them a tangible chance at the athlete’s 
biggest prize, a lucrative and glamorous post-college career in 
professional sports.79 That is a valuable lottery ticket, one so prized 
that thousands of youth will train countless hours pursuing the dream. 
Schools that feed athletes to the pros advertise this substantial job 
benefit to potential recruits.80 
Despite this attractive financial package, apparently the grant-in-
aid fails to cover the full cost of attendance, which would include a 
little spending money.81 Restrictions on outside income and other 
types of financial aid,82 however, in effect make the grant-in-aid and 
its surrounding perquisites the sum total of the athlete’s 
compensation.83 Despite the ubiquitous focus on the full athletic 
scholarship, most high-level student-athletes are not on full 
scholarship. Instead, most athletes who play “non-revenue” sports 
 
79 How Do Athletic Scholarships Work, supra note 72 (discussing how very few NCAA 
student-athletes eventually play professional sports); see id. (discussing how many football 
players (1.7%), baseball players (11.6%), and women’s basketball players (0.9%) will 
eventually turn professional). 
80 Stacey Meyer, Unequal Bargaining Power: Making the National Letter of Intent 
More Equitable, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 227, 227 (2004) (explaining that during the 
process of recruiting athletes, “[t]he coach promises them the world: that over the next 
four of five years they will become a star, be ready for the pros, or get into the academic 
program they want”). 
81 RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE $6 BILLION HEIST: ROBBING 
COLLEGE ATHLETES UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 12 (2012) [hereinafter HUMA], 
available at http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-Heist-Study_Full.pdf (“College 
athletes on full scholarship do not receive a ‘free ride.’ For the 2011-2012 academic year, 
the average annual scholarship shortfall (out of pocket expenses) for each Football Bowl 
Series (FBS) “full” scholarship athlete was $3,285.”).  
82 The courts have upheld NCAA restrictions on the total aid, from any source, that 
may be provided to a student-athlete. Wiley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 612 F.2d 
473, 477 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding an NCAA rule that prevented a student-athlete from 
receiving a basic education opportunity grant as well as an athletic scholarship). 
83 Since 1992, student-athletes are allowed to “receive a Pell Grant in combination with 
other institutional financial aid, provided the overall grant does not exceed the value of a 
full grant-in-aid plus $1700.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 15.2.4.1. In 2004, the 
NCAA again revised its by-laws to allow students to receive the full value of the grant-in-
aid plus a Pell Grant. Id. § 15.1. Prior to 1992, student-athletes could receive a Pell Grant, 
but the NCAA required that the proceeds of the grant be paid directly to the school’s 
athletic department. Letter from Richard C. Stiener, Dir. of U.S. Gen. Accounting Office 
of Special Investigations, to Senator Stan Nunn, Chairman of the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (Jan. 10, 1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/products 
/OSI-95-13R. The proceeds of the grant in excess of $1700 were paid directly to the 
school’s athletic department. Id. 
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divide a limited number of scholarships among team members.84 
Were more athletes to be compensated, or the same number were to 
receive greater compensation, Title IX requirements85 would likely 
mandate that certain female athletes be compensated 
commensurately.86 Many commentators have described the NCAA’s 
 
84 The NCAA distinguishes between “head count” sports, where every athlete who 
receives financial aid is granted a full scholarship, and “equivalency” sports, where a 
coach may divide scholarships into partial allotments. For instance, baseball is an 
“equivalency” sport. Although the NCAA permits Division I baseball a total of 11.7 full 
scholarships per year, scholarships can only be divided among twenty-seven players. In 
contrast, Football Bowl Subdivision is a “head count” sport. The NCAA restricts FBS 
programs to twenty-five full scholarships per year. 
85 Title IX prohibits gender discrimination by educational institutions that receive 
federal funding. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2014). Regulations promulgated under Title IX 
ensure that this prohibition applies to college athletics, requiring “equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes.” 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.41(a), (c) (2014). Section 
106.41(c) provides a non-exhaustive list of ten factors that are used to determine whether 
an institution is providing equal athletic opportunities. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). These ten 
factors form the basis for Title IX litigation in collegiate athletics and result in two distinct 
types of claims: (1) effective accommodation; and (2) equal treatment. See, e.g., Biediger 
v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit gave the following 
explanation of these two claims: “Effective accommodations claims . . . concern the 
opportunity to participate in athletics, while equal treatment claims allege sex-based 
differences in the schedules, equipment, coaching, and other factors affecting participants 
in athletics.” Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 
2010). See the following cases for a historical overview of Title IX litigation: Biediger, 
691 F.3d at 108 (holding that a 3.6% disparity between the percentage of women enrolled 
at Quinnipiac University and the percentage of women on varsity sports teams violated 
Title IX by failing to provide “proportionate athletic participation opportunities,” and 
therefore affirming the district court’s order enjoining Quinnipiac from eliminating its 
women’s volleyball team); Neal v. Bd. of Trustees, 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(reversing the district court and holding that a university does not violate Title IX when it 
reduces male roster spots in an effort to reach proportionate participation between male 
and female athletes); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832–35 (10th Cir. 
1993) (agreeing with the district court that Colorado State University failed to fully 
accommodate female athletes when it cut women’s softball and affirming the lower court’s 
order to reinstate the sport); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 906–07 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction ordering Brown University to 
reinstate women’s gymnastics and volleyball because of Brown’s failure to meet the 
effective accommodation requirement); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 583–
84 (W.D. Penn. 1992) (finding that Indiana University of Pennsylvania “discriminated 
against women athletes on the basis of gender” and ordering it to restore its women’s 
gymnastics and field hockey teams). 
86 Mechelle Voepel, Title IX a Pay-For-Play Roadblock, ESPN.COM (July 15, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6769337/title-ix-seen-substantial-roadblock    
-pay-play-college-athletics (“In regard to the concept of ‘pay-for-play,’ Title IX is 
generally seen as a substantial roadblock” that likely offers “no viable end-around Title IX 
to allow schools to pay only those athletes who are profitable in sports, which generally 
are football and men’s basketball.”). Contrast with Ellen J. Staurowsky, “A Radical 
Proposal”: Title IX Has No Role in College Sport Pay-For-Play Discussions, 22 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 575, 592 (2012) (arguing that if athletic scholarships represent a form of 
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limitation on compensation as a form of exploitation.87 Undoubtedly, 
individual colleges earn rent on their most popular, highest-
performing athletes. If athletes insisted on receiving their full worth, 
the highest performers would be more likely to receive it, provided 
the colleges were not obliged to pay full value for average, middling 
athletes. Some athletes have to be exploited, in the sense of earning 
less than their full value, to account for the substantial losses incurred 
in failed attempts at recruiting,88 or in the award of lucrative 
scholarships to athletes who turn out to be poor performers.89 In 
theory, the college’s return on investment in athletics should be no 
higher than its return on capital in other ventures; otherwise, capital 
would flow from other uses into further investments in sports. The 
labor market does clear. Many young athletes compete strenuously for 
college athletic scholarships.90 
 
pay for the work of athletes in televised, commercial sport entertainment, Title IX may not 
apply: “The arguments for and against athletic scholarships have never been sex-specific 
but are grounded in an understanding of what an athletic scholarship represents, which 
is pay-for-play. In light of conversations about pay-for-play and whether Title IX applies, 
this should be an important consideration within the conversation. If the NCAA, in its 
scholarship structure, has been getting away with denying revenue-generating athletes 
employment status for all of these years, Title IX holds no jurisdiction.”). 
87 Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 207–08 (1990) (proposes that the NCAA’s amateurism rules 
constitute antitrust violations: “the technical and inflexible restrictions on amateurism have 
resulted in inevitable rules violations which breed disrespect for educational institutions 
and damage societal values.”); see also HUMA, supra note 81, at 3 (arguing that the NCAA 
rules will deny FBS football and men’s basketball college student-athletes at least $6.2 
billion that they otherwise would have received in a fair market. Under the current rules, 
football players stand to receive around seventeen percent of their fair market value, 
whereas men’s basketball players stand to receive eight percent of theirs); Jason Whitlock, 
Greedy NCAA Still Exploiting Athletes, FOX SPORTS (Mar. 30, 2011, 6:50 PM), http://msn 
.foxsports.com/collegebasketball/story/ncaa-amateur-concept-is-a-sham-that-exploits         
-players-032911 (discussing the NCAA’s hypocrisy in upholding the “amateurism myth” 
for college student-athletes while “everyone else profits”). 
88 Mitch Sherman, Balancing the Recruiting Budget, ESPN.COM (June 12, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/recruiting/football/story/_/id/8041461/the-cost-recruiting 
(discussing the amount that major Division I football programs spend on recruiting each 
year); see id. (showing that the University of Tennessee spent close to $1.5 million on 
football recruiting in 2011). 
89 How Do Athletic Scholarships Work, supra note 70 (discussing how many athletic 
scholarships are granted for one academic year and then annually renewed, meaning that 
coaches have the option to not renew a scholarship for a poor performer). 
90 Id. (discussing how very few high school athletes earn athletic scholarships; 
according to the NCAA, less than two percent of high school athletes are awarded 
collegiate athletic scholarships). 
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The rules of amateurism limit the ability of student-athletes to 
obtain professional assistance in determining their value.91 Where any 
other student may consult with a professional career coach or lawyer, 
athletes are prohibited, outside of carefully limited opportunities,92 
from employing assistance to assess their true value.93 This restriction 
appears unconscionable, yet many institutions that work with youths 
similarly restrict access to lawyers or other professional advisors in 
situations where adults would be at liberty to do so. These restrictions 
are designed to preclude adversarial relationships, and reflect the 
status of the university or other institution as acting in an essentially 
parental role. 
Student-athletes are also not permitted to test the professional 
market without compromising their eligibility.94 This restriction 
precludes a student who may wish to offer cheap or free labor to 
enhance career prospects as a professional athlete. Unlike other 
students, who are free to intern with firms in their field or profession 
without penalty or reprisal, student-athletes may not spend their off-
seasons working as an athlete in their collegiate sport.95 In effect, they 
cannot work part-time during the academic year, as any income 
 
91 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 12.3.1 (stipulating that athletes who agree to be 
represented by an agent are deemed ineligible from playing intercollegiate sports). 
92 Id. § 12.3.2 (allowing an athlete to seek legal counsel concerning a proposed 
professional sports contract, but the lawyer is not permitted to be present during the actual 
negotiation). 
93 Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009), 
settlement reached and Order vacated. In Oliver, the NCAA declared a student-athlete 
ineligible for having his attorney present during negotiations with professional team. Id. at 
23. The student asked the court to declare Bylaw 12.3.2 invalid and sought a permanent 
injunction to allow him to continue collegiate athletic career. Id. at 24. The court held that 
it is impossible to allow student-athletes to hire lawyers and then attempt to control what 
the lawyer can do for the client. Id. at 31. The court also held that NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2 is 
arbitrary and capricious, allowing for “exploitation of the student-athlete ‘by professional 
and commercial enterprises,’ in contravention of the positive intentions of the defendant.” 
Id. at 32. This Order was vacated when the NCAA settled with Oliver for $250,000. 
NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2 is still in effect. 
94 Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining 
that Division I football player entered the draft with one season of eligibility left, therefore 
becoming ineligible to play collegiate football. He was not drafted and sued the NCAA for 
an injunction permitting him to regain his eligibility. The court dismissed the case, holding 
that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules did not violate the Sherman Act); see 
also Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) 
(holding that NCAA eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust laws and the rules did not 
violate the Sherman Act). 
95 Shelton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(upholding the NCAA rule that bans a student-athlete from participating in a collegiate 
sport if that student-athlete has contracted to participate in that sport professionally). 
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earned by the athlete would be counted against the value of the 
scholarship.96 College student-athletes are also restricted in their use 
of future earnings. Unlike a music major who could borrow against 
her future earnings as a professional musician, student-athletes may 
not borrow against their future income stream. 
The most powerful argument in favor of compensating college 
student-athletes observes that players in basketball and football 
generate millions of dollars for their respective universities.97 Yet 
many factors contribute to producing the sellout crowds and 
television contracts, including stadium design, concessions, alumni 
associations, and state pride.98 Thus, athletes alone do not generate 
the revenue.99 With that said, the athletes are the entertainers on the 
stage, and in other fields, usually, the on-stage performers receive the 
largest compensation.100 Yet, ascribing the lion’s share of the total 
revenue to the athletes begs the question of which athletes actually 
produced the revenue. A winning athletic program will attract the 
finest players each year in part because the athletes from previous 
seasons created the athletic powerhouse. Stars who enroll can be 
assured that their teammates will also be high-level players who can 
complement them, and that they will play in a highly-competitive 
league in front of a national audience. It is the school name and 
tradition, a product of the efforts of past teams, coaches and others 
 
96 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 15.2.6. 
97 Tyson Hartnett, Why College Athletes Should Be Paid, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 
2013, 7:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tyson-hartnett/college-athletes-should-be 
-paid_b_4133847.html (noting that college basketball and football programs generate 
revenue for the university); see also Christian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-In-Aid: An 
Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97, 100–01 
(2007) (noting that universities have used student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses 
to sell products, including videogames, DVDs, memorabilia, and trading cards). 
98 Yun Seok Choi et al., Motivational Factors Influencing Sport Spectator Involvement 
at NCAA Division II Basketball Games, 3 J. FOR STUD. SPORTS & ATHLETES EDUC. 265, 
270–71, 279 (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=1034&context=coe_khs. 
99 Additionally, professional teams also generate revenue from their history and the 
strength of their programs. The fact that leading professional franchises maintain a steady 
revenue despite high player turnover is a testament to the high ongoing value of the 
franchise. Despite this limitation, professional teams are able to find a value for their 
players, even for the marginal ones. Colleges could use the recruiting process to find that 
value as well, although putatively that determination would be more costly and subject to 
greater uncertainty. 
100 Eliana Dockterman, Hollywood A-Listers Are Way Overpaid, Study Says, TIME ENT. 
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://entertainment.time.com/2013/11/13/hollywood-a-listers-are-way    
-overpaid-study-says. 
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that contribute to that opportunity for the next top high school athlete 
and assure the continuation of the revenue stream.101 
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to determine which players 
produced the revenue and set a price accordingly. Basketball and 
football are quintessential team sports, where wins are the product of 
the joint efforts of teammates. In technical terms, there is a high 
complementarity of inputs.102 A star quarterback is worth little 
without effective blockers and receivers who can get open. Likewise, 
a quality running game enhances the quarterback’s performance 
indirectly. As a result, in the very sports that comprise the revenue 
sports in college,103 it is very difficult to determine how much each 
player, even star players, matter to the product, at the margin, over a 
replacement player.104 With that said, star student-athletes are hugely 
significant in producing wins and revenue, and professional teams in 
these sports do arrive at a price for players. But, the idea that 
“fairness” demands that a team’s revenue be distributed to the players 
 
101 In 2012, nine of the top ten revenue-generating Division I athletic programs were 
ranked in the top fifteen of all-time most wins in either Men’s Basketball or College 
Football. USA Today Sports’ College Athletic Finances, USA TODAY (May 14, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics      
-finances-database/54955804/1; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2012–2013 NCAA 
MEN’S BASKETBALL DIVISION I RECORDS, ALL-TIME WINNINGEST TEAMS, BY 
VICTORIES 66 (2013), available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/football_records/2012/fbs 
.pdf; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2012 NCAA FOOTBALL RECORDS–FBS 
INDIVIDUAL RECORDS, ALL-TIME WON-LOST RECORDS, BY PERCENTAGE 64 (2013), 
available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/m_basketball_RB/2013/2013%2001%20Div 
.%20I%2010-16.pdf. 
102 Complementary inputs refers to the notion that a team’s performance is a product of 
multiple efforts, including teammates and coaches. BRAD R. HUMPHREYS & DENNIS R. 
HOWARD, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 166 
(2008); see also Roger Noll, Sports Economics at Fifty 31 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Res., 
Discussion Paper No. 06-11, 2006), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi  
-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/06-11.pdf (noting that Walter Neale and 
Simon Rottenberg contended that teams are complementary inputs with respect to games 
and championships). 
103 Cork Gaines, These 20 Programs Are The Biggest Money Makers In College Sports, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 4, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-20-college   
-sports-programs-are-the-biggest-moneymakers-2012-1?op=1. 
104 Wins in baseball, by contrast, appear to be much less a joint product (less 
complementarity of inputs). Therefore, if a pro team were to hire the league’s best first 
baseman, best second baseman, and so on, the odds are high it will have a very successful 
team. In other words, the teams with the highest payrolls in Major League Baseball usually 
are the best teams. Shahriar Hasan, Can Money Buy Success?: A Study of Team Payroll 
and Performance in the MLB, J. GLOBAL BUS. MGMT. 1 (2008), available at http://www 
.jgbm.org/page/20%20Shahriar%20Hasan%20.pdf. In basketball, where teamwork is 
much more important, the size of the team’s payroll is not a good predictor of win totals. 
HoopsHype Salaries, HOOPSHYPE (Mar. 13, 2014), http://hoopshype.com/salaries.htm. 
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is a bit too simple;105 it avoids the multiple inputs that produce 
revenue, and also begs the question about exactly what contribution a 
particular player makes to that revenue. Arguably, a lock-step 
system106 that distributes some portion of the revenue to the players 
equally would address equity concerns. Perhaps, that is precisely the 
system currently employed. 
If student-athletes were paid a competitive price for their services, 
it is not clear that their compensation would increase. Proponents of 
the compensation argument point to the millions of dollars earned 
from college sports and assume that eliminating the NCAA 
prohibition against paying athletes would enrich the comparatively 
impoverished student-athlete.107 To be fair, some athletes would earn 
a substantial salary, such as the star athlete in a major revenue sport 
such as basketball. Colleges would bid against each other, and 
perhaps even the professional leagues, for the players’ services. But 
the star college student-athlete today already in effect receives a 
substantial salary: in the near future, he will be eligible for a 
professional-level income stream. Although not permitted explicitly, 
it appears that the star student-athlete can borrow against that 
potential future income while in college, especially once the season 
ends and threats of disqualification become superfluous. So the star 
can already capitalize on his income potential; the fact that the source 
of the income is his future professional team and not his one-year 
alma mater makes no financial difference.108 
 
105 Harvard Law Review Association, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA 
Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1314 (1992) (arguing that the ban on 
compensation to student-athletes should be lifted to allow them to receive a larger share of 
the annual revenues from their efforts); see also Ramogi Huma, A Fair Day’s Pay For a 
Fair Day’s Work, Opinion, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2013, 5:47 PM), http://www.usnews.com 
/debate-club/should-ncaa-athletes-be-paid/a-fair-days-pay-for-a-fair-days-work. 
106 A lock-step compensation model pays all individuals of equivalent experience the 
same rate, irrespective of an individual’s performance. Brian Sullivan & Laurence D. 
Connor, Managing the Large Law Firm, 64 MICH. B.J. 1200, 1203 (1985). Applying this 
principle to sports, all entry-level athletes would be paid equally, and as the athletes gained 
experience, they would receive equal increases in compensation. 
107 Goldman, supra note 87, at 211–12 (arguing that the NCAA operates a cartel that 
exploits student-athletes, who are compensated less than their fair market value); Jamilah 
King, How Scholarships Leave Student-Athletes Powerless in the NCAA Game, 
COLORLINES (Mar. 23, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/03/ncaa 
_scholarships_rules.html (noting that the poorest student-athletes in football and basketball 
generated revenues of $30 million in 2009–10, while living up to $5000 below the poverty 
line). 
108 Some professionally-qualified star athletes return to college for an additional year 
rather than turn professional. These athletes have impliedly determined that the value of 
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The rest of the student-athletes, however, whose dreams of college 
stardom do not materialize, are protected from the non-renewal of 
their scholarship. The rules of the NCAA and of most schools 
combine to limit scholarship termination to cases of academic failure, 
attendance problems, drug abuse, and the like.109 As a result, as long 
as they adhere to team and university rules, these athletes will get to 
pursue their degrees and the lifetime income those degrees entail.110 
Coaches can do little about malingerers or others whose talent they 
misjudged in awarding them a scholarship.111 College sidelines are 
full of scholarship athletes whom coaches would love to cut. In an 
environment in which yearly salary, not scholarships, constitutes the 
primary means of compensation, coaches might not be as restricted by 
rules to maintain pay grades. Coaches might over-promise recruits, 
only to cut their pay when athletic performance does not meet 
expectations. Certainly, reputational fears would slow most college 
coaches from “bait-and-switch” recruiting; nonetheless, establishing a 
relationship between the student-athlete and the school that resembles 
an employment relationship would probably render the player more 
vulnerable to the vagaries of at-will employment, with the college 
coach as the boss. 
A scholarship package112 that approximates $50,000 per year in 
value113 clearly does cap certain players’ earnings; at the same time, 
 
one more year in college is more valuable than any tangible present-day compensation. 
See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 380–81. 
109 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 15.3.4 (noting that the student-athlete’s 
scholarship is protected from termination for athletic performance for the duration of the 
scholarship period, which is established in the financial aid agreement between the 
university and the athlete); Dave Galehouse & Ray Lauenstein, The Lowdown on Athletic 
Scholarships, NEXTSTEPU, http://www.nextstepu.com/the-lowdown-on-athletic-scholar 
ships.art#.Uv7gwfaYaP8 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
110 Indeed, a recent study by the National College Players’ Association showed that for 
the 2008-09 season, roughly eighty percent of student-athletes in Division I Men’s 
basketball have their athletic scholarships renewed. Goldman, supra note 87, at 212. 
Although non-star athletes will not earn salaries from professional sports, roughly eighty 
percent of these athletes, of whom many may not be able to afford college otherwise, will 
enjoy the use of their degree for the rest of their lives. 
111 Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602, 
607 (D.C. Minn. 1972) (upholding a preliminary injunction to prevent school from 
dismissing student-athletes during the period of their scholarship without proper 
procedural requirements). 
112 Full scholarships cover tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-
related books. How Do Athletics Scholarships Work?, supra note 70. 
113 See Jerry Carino, Athletes, Administrators Debate Scholarship Stipends, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 28, 2013, 11:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013 
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it probably over-compensates other players. Consequently, it is more 
accurate to describe the current labor market for college student-
athletes as featuring a single, mandatory price rather than a maximum 
price. It is tantamount to a lock-step pay system, one that is utilized 
by many employers and unions in setting salaries. Lock-step pay 
systems tend to be preferred because they help to insulate the 
employees from the caprice and vindictiveness of the boss. Some 
student-athletes might prefer the lock-step system. The current pay 
rate appears sufficient to clear the market of suitors.114 
If colleges are compelled to pay athletes in cash rather than with 
scholarships, the total cost could be substantial. A scholarship is an 
ideal form of compensation for the school. Its market value, 
ostensibly the stated tuition, substantially exceeds its marginal cost to 
the school of an additional student.115 An athlete likely values his 
education and other athletic opportunities more than the marginal cost 
to the school, but less than the stated tuition. If payments were 
allowed in lieu of a scholarship, athletes whose marginal revenue 
product were lower than the stated tuition, but greater than the 
marginal cost to the university, would still likely receive a scholarship 
as part of their compensation package.116 
III 
STUDENT-ATHLETES WHO ARE PAID 
It appears likely that, in the near future, there will be some increase 
in the compensation of college student-athletes.117 That increase 
 
/09/28/athletes-administrators-debate-ncaa-scholarship-stipends/2890117 (reporting that 
the broad belief is that the value of an athletic scholarship is roughly $50,000). 
114 The fact that the market clears does not justify the price collusion. Even though no 
harmful output reduction would happen, the absolute quality of the players engaging in the 
sport would likely diminish, as athletes would choose away from the sport. 
115 Victor A. Matheson et al., The Bottom Line: Accounting for Revenues and 
Expenditures in Intercollegiate Athletics 11 (N. Am. Ass’n of Sports Economists, Working 
Paper No. 11-01, 2011), available at http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/Matheson 
OConnor_CollegeAccounting.pdf (noting that the cost of an athletic scholarship to an 
offering university could be near zero if the student-athlete is enrolled in courses at below 
capacity). 
116 Salary and scholarships could be blended in a total compensation package, much 
like academic scholarships. The cost of scholarships to a university must also include the 
reservation price, which is the potential value that is used up once the scholarship is 
awarded and cannot be awarded again. In cost accounting terms, scholarships may be 
cheap, but to a coach they are precious. 
117 See Erin Cronk, Unlawful Encroachment: Why the NCAA Must Compensate 
Student-Athletes For the Use of Their Names, Images, and Likenesses, 34 U. LA VERNE L. 
REV. 135, 142–43 (2013) (highlighting that public opinion has shifted in favor of 
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could take one of several forms. Colleges appear to have reached the 
maximum of “in-kind” compensation for students in the major 
revenue sports: nearly every good for which the school itself is the 
vendor, including education, lodging, board, and books, is routinely 
part of the “full-ride” grant-in-aid.118 Additional compensation could 
take one of two forms, alone or in combination. 
The first form of compensation could be a lessening of the 
NCAA’s prohibition on an athlete receiving “extra pay or extra 
benefits,” thus allowing athletes to exploit their status as a scholarship 
athlete.119 Extra compensation could come from sources outside the 
university, such as loans against future earnings, salary for past 
performance,120 commercial exploitation of an athlete’s right of 
publicity in advertising or other public appearances,121 or receipt of 
direct payments for future professional performance.122 This form of 
compensation, at issue in ongoing litigation,123 would free athletes to 
exploit their status for financial gain.124 It has the advantage of not 
 
compensating student-athletes); Ed Graney, Paying Student-Athletes Gaining Momentum, 
LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Sept. 24, 2013, 9:46 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/columns     
-blogs/ed-graney/paying-student-athletes-gaining-momentum (reporting that the 
momentum to compensate student-athletes is at an all-time high). 
118 See supra note 33. 
119 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, §§ 12, 16 (“Extra pay includes ‘any expenses 
received . . . in excess of actual and necessary travel and meal expenses and apparel or 
equipment . . . for practice and game competition’ and Article 16 bans ‘extra benefits.’”). 
120 Colo. Seminary (Univ. of Denver) v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 897–98 (D. Colo. 
1976) (rejecting ineligible student-athletes’ argument that they should be deemed eligible 
despite having received compensation from outside groups for expenses). 
121 See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
122 See Josh Luchs & James Dale, Pro Sports Can Pay College Athletes If Schools 
Won’t, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/pro         
-sports-can-pay-college-athletes-if-schools-wont-2012-4. 
123 In 2009, former UCLA basketball player Ed O’Bannon filed suit against the NCAA 
and the Collegiate Licensing Company, claiming that the NCAA failed to compensate him 
for the use of his name, image, and likeness on several merchandise. This suit was 
consolidated into what is now termed In re Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., No. C 09-1967CW, 2010 WL 5644656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010). In November 
2013, O’Bannon was permitted to amend the complaint to add more plaintiffs. 
124 The O’Bannon lawsuit demands that the NCAA begin to compensate student-
athletes for its use of their image and likeness, which the NCAA uses in television 
broadcasts, video games, and merchandise sales. Currently, in order to become eligible, a 
student-athlete must sign away his right to compensation. The form is known as the Form 
08-3a Student Athlete Statement. For commentary on the lawsuit and its potential impact 
on the NCAA and its athletes, see Mark Koba, The Lawsuit That Could Reshape College 
Sports, CNBC.COM, (Dec. 21, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101285999/page 
/1 (predicting that because of the lawsuit, the NCAA’s ability to use a student-athlete’s 
image without compensation is likely to come to an end); Steve Berkowitz, Plaintiff 
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presenting a direct cost to the university, apart from foregone income 
if the university wished to exploit the athlete’s right of publicity 
itself.125 It also has the advantage of roughly calibrating an athlete’s 
“extra benefits” according to an athlete’s role on the team and 
importance to the team’s success. Star quarterbacks would be able to 
earn more than unnoticed offensive lineman. Less positively, allowing 
student-athletes to capitalize on their future earning potential and 
otherwise exploit their present notoriety might lead to the type of self-
indulgent “showboating” for which the professional game is 
distinctive. Student-athletes engaged in such blatant commercial and 
branding activities would undoubtedly diminish the traditional 
amateur college sports product.126 
Compensation of student-athletes could also happen in the form of 
direct, cash stipends.127 These could be lock-step for all four years, or 
 
Fillings in O’Bannon Suit Reveal Target Issues, USA TODAY (Jan. 14, 2014, 12:27 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/01/14/ncaa-ed-obannon-name-and      
-likeness-suit/4469295/ (identifying the following key issues in the case: (1) whether game 
broadcasts are commercial speech and thus entitled to First Amendment protection, (2) 
whether ending compensation limits for football and men’s basketball players would have 
an adverse impact on women’s and other men’s sports, and (3) the compensation ban’s 
role, if any, in helping to integrate athletes into a college’s academic environment); Marc 
Edelman, Why the NCAA Could Lose the O’Bannon Lawsuit, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2013, 8:30 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/10/29/why-the-ncaa-could-lose-the 
-obannon-lawsuit/ (suggesting the court could rule the NCAA’s “no pay” rule violates 
anti-trust law because it is plausible for the court to find that (1) the NCAA exercises 
“market power” over student-athletes, (2) the NCAA suppresses market competition, and 
(3) there are less restrictive ways the NCAA could encourage competition). 
125 Universities have used student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses to sell 
products, including videogames, DVDs, memorabilia, and trading cards. Christian Dennie, 
Changing the Game: The Litigation That May Be the Catalyst For Change in 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 48 (2012). Recently, Texas A & M 
made roughly $72 million in branded merchandise sales relating to its football program 
and Heisman winner, Johnny Manziel. Scoop Jackson, The Myth of Parity, ESPN.COM 
(Sept. 12, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/9666004/pay-play 
-answer-college-athletics (alleging that Texas A&M made roughly $72 million in branded 
merchandise sales relating to its football program and Heisman winner, Johnny Manziel). 
Beyond the individual teams, the NCAA itself stands to profit from student-athletes’ 
names. Peter Berkes, Official NCAA Store set up to Profit off Player Names, SBNATION 
(Aug. 6, 2013, 2:49 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/8/6/4594858 
/official-ncaa-store-set-up-to-profit-off-player-names. 
126 See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The NCAA 
markets college football as a product distinct from professional football. The eligibility 
rules create the product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures. 
The goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with academics. Its requirements reasonably 
further this goal.”). 
127 Robert John Givens,”Capitamateuralism”: An Examination of the Economic 
Exploitation of Student-Athletes by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 82 
UMKC L. REV. 205, 227 (2013); Cronk, supra note 117, at 143 (noting that former 
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based on seniority. The stipend payment could alternatively be geared 
to position, playing time, or coach’s discretion, set at the time of 
recruitment or re-determined each academic year. In most non-
revenue “equivalency” sports,128 although compensation is in-kind, 
the amount of the compensation is established according to this 
model. Scholarships for individual members of the men’s golf team, 
for instance, are routinely increased, reduced, or eliminated at the end 
of the spring season, at the discretion of the coaches and usually 
according to the player’s performance and the overall needs of the 
team’s recruiting. Making such determinations for a cash-based 
compensation scheme in a revenue sport would be substantially the 
same. Any compensation scheme that allowed the coach or university 
to vary the salary according to the athlete’s value to the team would 
have the advantage of incentivizing optimal efforts from the athlete. It 
would have the obvious disadvantage of further unbalancing the 
coach-player relationship. 
Whichever form of compensation happens, it is unlikely that this 
change alone will alter the current labor market in college sports. In 
other words, the wealthier football and basketball programs are 
unlikely to acquire a greater number of the best players than they do 
already. Currently, all student-athletes in certain sports are offered 
“full-ride” athletic scholarships that are roughly commensurate with 
those offered at other universities.129 As a result, in seeking athletic 
 
Nebraska State Senator Ernie Chambers proposed legislation that would provide a stipend 
for student-athletes to cover additional expenses). Recently, the NCAA has considered 
offering a stipend in addition to athletic scholarships. In late 2011, the NCAA board 
approved a $2000 stipend, but delayed implementation in January 2012 after colleges 
criticized the move. NCAA President Emmert Fights for Student-Athletes’ Right to More 
Funds, NCAA.COM (Dec. 6, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article 
/2012-12-05/ncaa-president-emmert-fights-student-athletes-right-more-funds. Since that 
time, NCAA President Mark Emmert has reaffirmed a commitment to the stipend. Bernie 
Wilson, Power Conferences Get Autonomy Nod in Straw Vote, REPUBLICAN AM. (Jan. 17, 
2014, 10:01 PM), http://www.rep-am.com/articles/2014/01/21/sports/college/778656.txt. 
128 The NCAA classifies all college sports into one of two categories for purposes of 
athletic scholarships: head count and equivalency sports. A head count sport may result in 
a full-ride athletic scholarship. Head count sports include Division I football; men’s 
basketball; and women’s basketball, gymnastics, tennis, and volleyball. An equivalency 
sport may result in a partial athletic scholarship. Equivalency sports are all non-head count 
sports, and they are also known as non-revenue sports. Scott R. Rosner, The Growth of 
NCAA Women’s Rowing: A Financial, Ethical, and Legal Analysis, 11 SETON HALL J. 
SPORT L. 297, 316 n.167 (2001). 
129 The NCAA requires that no financial aid shall exceed the cost of attendance, which 
includes the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, 
transportation, and other expenses related to attendance. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, 
§§ 15.01.6, 15.02.2 (capping the allowable benefits that may be offered to a student-
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recruits, universities compete along other dimensions. Athletes will 
choose a school based on the success of its sports program in 
scheduling high-level competition, participating in the most 
competitive leagues, and earning national television broadcasts, 
especially appearances in the seasonal national championship 
tournaments.130 The quality of the coaching staff also matters, as 
players can improve their performance and increase their chances of a 
professional career.131 Other factors, such as the quality of the 
academic program, practice facilities, dorm room and meal plan, 
likely also play a role. Most importantly, recruits respond to the 
recruiter who is best able to earn the trust of the athlete and portray 
the school as a place that suits the athlete’s desires. Unable to pay the 
student, schools will, instead, pay the person who is best skilled at 
recruiting the student.132 In short, top programs today deploy the 
financial advantage that results from a winning program to hire the 
best coaches, build impressive practice facilities,133 and provide a 
 
athlete, thus a “full ride” student-athlete will receive the same level of benefits regardless 
of where they go to school, except for variances in the cost of attending a particular 
university). Thus, all full-ride scholarships will offer every student-athlete the same level 
of coverage, except for variances in the cost of attending a particular university. 
130 For example, the heart of college basketball is March Madness. One study showed 
that an athlete’s performance in the March Madness tournament can improve that athlete’s 
draft in the NBA by over four slots. The same study noted that an athlete’s strong 
performance during March Madness is a good indicator of how that athlete will perform in 
the NBA. Lester Picker, Hiring Decisions for High-Value Employees: Evidence from 
March Madness Performance, THE NBER DIGEST 5–6 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.nber.org/digest/jul12/jul12.pdf (noting that a student-athlete who performs 
well in the March Madness basketball tournament may improve his draft prospects in the 
NBA by over four slots, and also noting that an athlete’s performance in March Madness 
can be a good indicator of the athlete’s future performance in the NBA). 
131 There is a correlation between the highest-paid college basketball coaches and the 
success of the team’s players. The salaries of the three highest-paid coaches are: (1) Mike 
Krzyyzewski, Duke–$7.2 million; (2) John Calipari, Kentucky–$5.4 million; and (3) Rick 
Pitino, Louisville–$5.0 million. These three teams were the NCAA champions three of the 
last four years. Cork Gaines, Here Are the Salaries For the Highest-Paid College 
Basketball Coaches, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/here-are-the-salaries-for-the-highest-paid-college-basketball-coaches-2013-12?op=1. 
132 The ten most highly sought high school basketball players from 2013 signed with 
one of four schools: Kentucky, Kansas, Duke, and Florida. The average salary of the head 
coaches at these schools is $5,325,000, and these coaches comprise four of the six highest-
paid coaches in college basketball. Recruiting Database, RECRUITING NATION 
BASKETBALL, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/college-sports/basketball/recruiting 
/rankings/_/class/2013 (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
133 Oregon football has built the most lavish practice facility in college football. “The 
college football facilities arms race is officially over, with Oregon unveiling its $68-
million Football Performance Center to the world this week. The six-story complex . . . 
contains 145,000 square feet of space for Ducks players, coaches and administrators 
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comfortable life for their student-athletes. Should universities be 
allowed, under some form of a free market, to offer salaries directly to 
athletic recruits, universities will deploy their financial advantages 
commensurately. 
A change along these lines would likely, however, occasion 
transfers of money. Currently, coaches earn the lion’s share of salaries 
that are paid from athletic revenues.134 Because athletes cannot be 
paid, the coaches who recruit them are given the salaries that would 
otherwise be allocated to the athletes. If the athletes were 
compensated more directly, student-athletes would be enriched, likely 
at a cost to athletic administrators, coaches, and the various athletic 
facilities that, heretofore, were funded to recruit athletes. Athletes 
considering recruiting offers would weigh the value of the offered 
cash stipend in light of the other benefits of the job, such as practice 
facilities or dormitory accommodations, much like any job recruit will 
assess the total compensation of a position to include both salary and 
benefits. Although proponents of the view that student-athletes should 
be paid ground their claims in terms of justice, invoking notions of 
involuntary servitude,135 it is more likely that athletes today take their 
compensation in forms other than money. Shifting that compensation 
to direct payments will not likely increase the total compensation and 
benefits universities currently bestow on scholarship athletes. 
Even under a quasi-professional system of paying student-athletes, 
universities with theoretically unlimited resources and a very high 
demand for winning outcomes would be unlikely to procure better 
players than they do currently. As Rottenberg instructs, a team’s 
behavior is not a function of its bank balance.136 Star athletes 
complement each other’s play: great quarterbacks perform better with 
great pass receivers. Yet the law of diminishing returns suggests a 
useful limit to the number of great players, a point beyond which each 
 
outfitted in black glass and jutting angles that more resemble a Silicon Valley start-up or 
modern art museum than a locker room.” Dan Greenspan, Oregon Unveils Eye-Popping 
New Football Performance Center, NFL (July 31, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.nfl.com 
/news/story/0ap1000000224020/article/oregon-unveils-eyepopping-new-football-perfor 
mance-center. 
134 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that efforts to restrict the 
salary of coaches have not survived antitrust scrutiny). 
135 See John K. Tokarz, Involuntary Servants: The NCAA’s Abridgement of Student-
Athletes’ Economic Rights in Perpetuity Violates the Thirteenth Amendment, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 1501, 1508 (2010) (arguing that the NCAA’s exploitation of student-athletes violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude). 
136 Rottenberg, supra note 1, at 255. 
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additional superior athlete is worth marginally less to the team. Other 
teams, in need of star performers, would outbid the comparatively 
indifferent wealthy team. In addition, diseconomies of scale would 
play a role. Although roster limitations might provide a categorical 
solution to a problem with a diseconomy of scale, so does the game 
itself. Playing time and positions are limited, and an excess of star 
players could present management problems. Even wealthy teams 
will be inclined to recruit some players who will serve happily in 
reduced, bench roles. 
If student-athletes are allowed, in the future, to extract extra pay or 
extra benefits from their college sports performance, the ability to 
transfer freely among schools will be very important to their earnings. 
The current rule,137 which requires transferring athletes to remain 
inactive for one academic year,138 would present a substantial 
impediment to the operation of a free market for labor. Even student-
athletes who “drop out” remain subject to this restriction.139 Much 
like the elimination of baseball’s reserve clause generated escalating 
salaries,140 curtailing impediments to the free transfer of college 
athletic labor would induce universities to bid against each other for 
desirable student-athletes. 
In one significant aspect, a rule allowing the direct compensation 
of athletes could have a welfare effect that might change the pool of 
athletes. For example, the more the collegiate sports industry moves 
toward a professional model, the more its athletes might be required 
 
137 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 14.5.1. 
138 English v. NCAA, 439 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (C.A. La.. 4th Cir. 1983) (upholding the 
NCAA transfer rule). 
139 Cf. McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F.Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). Under the NCAA 
bylaws, a student who transfers must sit out one year. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 
14.5.1. A student transfers from a collegiate institution if the student was “officially 
registered and enrolled in a minimum, full-time program of studies in any . . . semester of 
an academic year,” “attended a class,” “reported for a regular squad practice . . . prior to 
the beginning of any quarter or semester,” “participated in practice,” or “received 
institutional financial aid while attending a summer term.” Id. § 14.5.2. A transfer student 
from a four-year institution is not eligible to participate until he or she sits for one year, 
but an exception is provided if that student-athlete meets certain criteria, including having 
not participated in the sport for more than fourteen days in the last two years. Id. §§ 
14.5.5.2, 14.5.5.2.7. 
140 Jennifer K. Ashcraft & Craig A. Depken, II, The Introduction of the Reserve Clause 
in Major League Baseball: Evidence of its Impact on Select Player Salaries During the 
1880s, INT’L ASS’N OF SPORTS ECONOMISTS (Apr. 2007), available at http://college.holy 
cross.edu/RePEc/spe/AshcraftDepken_ReserveClause.pdf. 
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to pay for the costs of their training.141 Generally, colleges do not 
invest heavily in the training of student-athletes who participate in the 
equivalency sports; they do, however, invest heavily in training 
players for revenue-producing teams.142 If the rent from those teams 
is transferred to the players in the form of compensation, then the 
revenue and non-revenue sports will produce identical returns on 
capital. Sports whose athletes must cover their own costs of training 
tend to disfavor the comparatively poor and to favor athletes from 
middle and upper class families.143 
IV 
THE UNLIKELY DEMISE OF THE AMATEUR ATHLETE 
In the major college sports, the supply of labor is very elastic to 
price. Many competent players devote a substantial part of their youth 
practicing and improving their athletic prowess. Expenditures on 
sports-related instruction and improvement are at a historic highpoint. 
Young players devote themselves to games out of passion, for 
improved performance in high school, or for the chance at a college 
scholarship with its marginal opportunity at a professional career. 
If schools were allowed to compete for recruits with the offer of 
direct stipends, presumably some athletes would settle for no stipend 
at all. They might even be willing to perform without the aid of a 
tuition waiver or other scholarship entirely.144 Undoubtedly, if all 
student-athletes were in essence “free agents,” able to transfer without 
limitation and free to renegotiate their school stipend on a yearly 
 
141 This question requires a fuller account. Currently, the costs of training college-level 
athletes are shared. The athlete gains skills and improves his conditioning throughout his 
scholastic career; the college team provides the specific training to make the player useful 
within the particular team’s strategy and game plan. Arguably, were players compensated 
more generously, colleges would not diminish their specific training. On the other hand, if 
student-athletes had unrestricted freedom of movement, colleges might diminish their 
specific training to reflect their inability to maintain possession of their labor. See Gary S. 
Becker, HUMAN CAPITAL 11–29 (1964). 
142 See Adam Rittenberg, B1G Revenue Can’t Buy BCS Titles, ESPN.COM (Oct. 2, 
2013), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9754072/big-ten-football-bringing     
-big-revenue-no-national-championships-sight. 
143 See Jeffrey Standen, The Demise of the African-American Baseball Player, 18 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
144 A free market along these lines would require the NCAA to terminate its distinction 
between equivalency sports and “head count” sports. In the latter, athletes must receive a 
full scholarship. The men’s head count sports are football (85 scholarships) and basketball 
(13 scholarships). The women’s head count sports are basketball (15 scholarships), 
volleyball (12 scholarships), gymnastics (12 scholarships), and tennis (8 scholarships). 
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basis, the price of labor for many student-athletes would diminish. 
Some student-athletes would earn increased salaries; others would be 
relegated to diminished compensation. In this free labor market, the 
revenue or “head count” sports would begin to resemble the 
equivalency sports. For the typical equivalency sport, just one or two 
of the team members have a full scholarship; a few others will share 
fractions of a scholarship; and the remainder, often the majority of the 
team, earn no scholarship at all. These latter, non-scholarship student-
athletes fulfill every amateur ideal.145 They play for the love of the 
sport, sacrificing countless hours146 and sublimating their jealousy 
over their lack of a scholarship to ensure the team fields a full roster. 
Instead of sullen athletes on full scholarships who unhappily sit on the 
bench while their classmates play, every non-scholarship team 
member chooses to remain on the team despite his status. If the 
introduction of compensation into the revenue sports results in an 
increase of athletes without a compensation package, then 
paradoxically, a compensation scheme could reintroduce true 
amateurs to those teams. 
Players who are willing to sell their services for no wages or 
scholarship support are not truly going uncompensated. They may 
derive a very large psychic benefit from participating in the sport. By 
remaining on the team, they maintain a chance to contribute to the 
team, either during the game contests or during practice. They also 
might believe they will in time excel and thereby improve their 
chances for a scholarship,147 other payment, or even for a 
professional career. Experience will diminish uncertainty and increase 
knowledge,148 however, and the players will recalculate the 
probabilities they assign to the occurrence of events. As they find they 
have miscalculated, they will withdraw from the market, freeing 
roster positions on the team for the next class of recruits. All amateurs 
 
145 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 61, § 2.9. The NCAA has defined amateur ideal as an 
expectation that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their 
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and 
social benefits to be derived . . . [and] student-athletes should be protected from 
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.” Id. 
146 See Cody Goodwin, Zoeller Uses Non-Scholarship Status as Motivation to Play 
Better, DAILY IOWAN (May 1, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.dailyiowan.com/2013/05/01 
/Sports/33105.html. 
147 At the University of Kentucky, where recruiting classes consistently rank at the top, 
Jarrod Polson, a non-scholarship athlete, earned a scholarship by his second year. 
148 Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball Players’ Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242, 251 
(1956). 
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should regularly compare their love of the game and its attendant 
opportunities with the opportunity costs of the other school and social 
activities that team participation precludes. Decoupling athletic 
participation from the need to maintain eligibility for a college 
scholarship will allow student-athletes to make that calculation more 
clearly.149 
For those student-athletes fortunate enough to earn a salary for 
their athletic performance, they will likely be compensated close to 
full value. Star players attract fans, ensure winning seasons, increase 
chances at post-season success, and lure other strong players to the 
university. Much like the “winner-take-all” compensation featured in 
many professional sports,150 the university will pay for the star and 
will seek to make up for his salary by earning substantial rent from 
the league-average players who go with little or no compensation. 
The NCAA and its member universities have long profited from the 
relatively cheap labor provided by student-athletes. Under a free 
market compensation scheme in which the star players earned the 
lion’s share of the rewards, that exploitation would continue, albeit 
with the rents shared by some of the players themselves. 
If the compensation were provided in lock-step, then proceeds 
would be shared more equally among the student-athletes. 
Nonetheless, the star performers would receive the lion’s share of 
whatever other compensation remained at the discretion of the 
university. The stars would receive the more intense coaching, 
valuable playing time and exposure to professional scouts, and other 
benefits. No matter the form of compensation, schools will seek to 
attract and retain their best performers. 
 
149 A student who quits the team forfeits his scholarship. Taylor v. Wake Forest 
University, 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that a student who quit the 
team forfeited his scholarship); Begley v. Mercer University, 367 F.Supp. 908, 910 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1973) (upholding the dismissal of a student-athlete by the university after the 
university discovered the athlete failed to comply with the grade point average eligibility 
requirements of the NCAA). 
150 A winner-take-all labor market is the notion that a few people, who are vital to the 
success of a sports team, are commensurately rewarded. WILLLIAM A. MCEACHERN, 
ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 267 (2012) (noting that “LeBron James 
has been credited with filling once-empty seats and boosting the value of his team by $160 
million”). It is no surprise, for example, that back-to-back NBA champions the Miami 
Heat also enlist three of the top-ten highest-paid NBA stars: LeBron James, Dwyane 
Wade, and Chris Bosh. NBA Player Salaries- 2013–2014, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com 
/nba/salaries (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
The advent of compensation for college student-athletes will 
certainly enrich certain students while redirecting university 
expenditures. It will also hasten the demise of the amateur ideal, 
although strangely it might increase the number of student-athletes in 
the revenue sports who actually model that ideal. What it will not 
likely do, however, is be the catalyst for a change in the composition 
of team rosters. The successful programs will likely remain as such; 
the inferior programs will have no greater obstacle to improvement. 
Today, college student-athletes are compensated with NCAA-
approved grants-in-aid. A change in the form or amount of 
compensation is unlikely to alter the composition or quality of the 
teams. 
